UNVEILING VULNERABILITIES: A HOLISTIC ANALYSIS OF OAUTH PROTOCOL SECURITY IN CONTEMPORARY WEB ENVIRONMENTS

Abstract

The OAuth protocol has emerged as a vital component within contemporary web applications, facilitating the secure authentication and authorization of users for third-party services. Nonetheless, the widespread adoption of OAuth has heightened concerns regarding potential security vulnerabilities. This research endeavors to conduct a thorough security evaluation of the OAuth protocol as implemented in modern web applications, aiming to both identify and mitigate these risks. By scrutinizing the OAuth 2.0 specification in the context of contemporary systems-centric attacks, this study reveals vulnerabilities such as redirect_uri validation weaknesses that leave Identity Providers susceptible to redirect confusion and brute-force attacks on OAuth client_credentials grant types. Furthermore, it delves into the misuse of the scope parameter, demonstrating its potential for enabling unauthorized access. Through the presentation of end-to-end attack scenarios, which amalgamate various attack techniques with prevalent web application vulnerabilities, this research elucidates the possibility of complete compromise in the secure delegated access promised by OAuth 2.0. Moreover, the study includes the development of a laboratory environment tailored for a common OAuth scenario, intended to aid developers and security researchers in simulating exploitation and fostering a deeper understanding of the associated risks.