

Psychological Inquiry



An International Journal for the Advancement of Psychological Theory

ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: www.tandfonline.com/journals/hpli20

Cultural Animal Theory of Political Partisan Conflict and **Hostility**

Roy F. Baumeister & Brad J. Bushman

To cite this article: Roy F. Baumeister & Brad J. Bushman (2023) Cultural Animal Theory of Political Partisan Conflict and Hostility, Psychological Inquiry, 34:1, 1-16, DOI: 10.1080/1047840X.2023.2192642

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2023.2192642

9	© 2023 The Author(s). Published with license by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.
	Published online: 08 May 2023.
	Submit your article to this journal $oldsymbol{oldsymbol{\mathcal{G}}}$
hil	Article views: 2205
Q	View related articles ☑
CrossMark	View Crossmark data ☑
4	Citing articles: 1 View citing articles 🗹



TARGET ARTICLE

3 OPEN ACCESS



Cultural Animal Theory of Political Partisan Conflict and Hostility

Roy F. Baumeister^a and Brad J. Bushman^b

^aSchool of Psychology, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia; ^bSchool of Communication, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, USA

ABSTRACT

Seeking to understand and reduce partisan hostility, we propose that humans evolved to benefit from cultural societies. Societies perform two crucial tasks, which have grown apart and are now championed by political opponents: (1) amassing resources, and (2) distributing resources. The political right focuses on amassing resources, whereas the political left focuses on redistributing resources. Both tasks are needed for society to flourish, but they foster contrary policies. This explains how left and right disagree on moral emphases, attitudes about time, rights versus responsibilities, manipulative strategies, and societal enemies—and why sharing or alternation in power benefits society. Market economies use incentives to create wealth, but these increase inequality. We hope our theory will help foster mutual respect among those on the left and right as both sides come to appreciate what the other side does to benefit society.

KEYWORDS

Conservative; culture; evolution; liberal; one-party rule; partisan conflict

Let me now take a more comprehensive view, and warn you in the most solemn manner against the baneful effects of the spirit of party generally.

- George Washington, Farewell Address

For too long, our controversies seem to boil down to conservatives and liberals (or, if you prefer, traditionalists and progressives) talking past each other for the benefit of stirring up their loyalists, as partisans do in the primary campaigns of electoral politics. The rest of us are expected to line up with our team just as soon as they show their colors.

- Ken Wilson, A Letter to My Congregation

My commitment is to urge us all toward moderation and good will toward fellow citizens. If we can set aside unworthy emotions that deepen our political divide, concentrate on finding solutions to the problems our country and communities face, we can then work toward a brighter future with less rancor but firm in our purpose. Or, we can feed our primitive fight or flight impulse by lashing out in social media and then duck into our silos.

- Jeff Rasley (2017), Polarized!

Political conflict is ancient and seemingly universal. Moffett (2019) concluded that one essential feature of a society is a conceptual distinction between members and outsiders, and he provided compelling historical examples that when a society includes all known people, it soon splits apart into two. Thus, the human mind may not be suited for ongoing unity, and factional conflict may be the norm. Older Americans remember the lengthy cold war and its surprisingly abrupt end around 1990, whereupon internal divisions in American society seemed to increase in intensity and

hostility, leading to the currently rancorous "identity politics" (Fukuyama, 2018).

The goal of this article is to articulate a theory of partisan hostility that accounts for the perennial (and recently escalating) partisanship and opposition. It is a cultural theory with an evolutionary basis. It entertains the assumption that alternation in power is an important modern equilibrium, rather than that one party's policies are inherently superior to the others. Ideally it would explain the benefits of alternation in power, along with the increasing inability of the two sides to appreciate and respect each other. The logical basis for that would be that both left and right have valid insights and helpful policies, and that both make valuable contributions to societal flourishing. It must also recognize the uniqueness of human societies in this respect, given that most nonhuman societies have structurally stable societal arrangements, whereas human societies are constantly changing and adapting.

From a bird's-eye evolutionary perspective, the escalating conflict is both humdrum and surprising. It is humdrum because competition among groups with incompatible interests is a universal fact of human life. It is surprising because if some policies were indeed best for society, then the party that advocates them would presumably prevail in the long run. In that light, endless dispute, and the apparently unending alternation in power between center-left and center-right parties in many successful democracies, defies the assumption that societies will converge on the optimal policy. If one party has the right answers, it should eventually win all the elections, to the widespread satisfaction of pretty

much everyone. But this seems not to happen in successful democracies.

Alternatively, the long-term health and flourishing of a society may depend on having at least two viable political parties. The record of long-term one-party rule contains many of the world's most spectacular failures and underachievers, such as Zaire, Cuba, North Korea, Zimbabwe, Soviet Union, Indonesia, Mexico, Venezuela, and Ethiopia, not to mention the Communist dictatorships in eastern Europe from 1945 to 1990. Long-term one-party rule seems generally to result from forceful suppression of dissent, not from free elections.

It may be difficult for most people to accept the value of alternation in power between two viable political parties, because presumably most partisans on both left and right think their country would be best off if their preferred political party won all the elections. Against that view, we think the health and well-being of the nation and society are best served by having at least two well-functioning political parties. The present analysis seeks to provide insight into why that might be.

To preview our argument: We propose that human societies do two basic things. To be sure, they do much more, but these two tasks are essential to their success. First, they must amass more resources than individuals working alone could, and indeed more than simpler societies could. Second, they must share these resources throughout the society, not necessarily equally, but sufficiently so that the population increases. Biology measures success by population increase (quantity of life), and perhaps increases in comfort and well-being (quality of life). We propose that the political right focuses on the issue of amassing resources, whereas the political left focuses on distributing the resources across the population. Crucially, both tasks are essential. We shall suggest that the two tasks have become increasingly at odds (favoring opposite policies). That could account for the mutual incomprehension, disrespect, and hostility.

Our effort is intended as a hopeful attempt to reduce partisan hostility by fostering mutual understanding and respect. Inevitably, in today's climate of intense partisan hostility, staunch partisans of the left and the right will reject our message, because they believe that society's welfare is endangered by their opponents and only their own party can produce a good future. Hence, we anticipate some hostility will be directed at our view. As evidence for our view, however, we reiterate that long-term one-party rule has generally been bad for many societies. If there is benefit in alternation of power between left and right, that suggests that both have something positive to contribute to society's well-being. In the long run, we propose that the health and well-being of almost every society may be best served by sharing or alternating power between center-left and centerright parties.

We proceed as follows. Key terms are explained in Table 1. We document the increasing hostility and polarization between the left and the right. Next, we present the evolutionary background for our cultural animal theory as

Table 1. Explanation of key terms.

Although most democracies have both a left and a right, precise definitions are elusive. The left and right designations date back to the seating in the French Estates-General in 1789, itself a disastrous failure that led to the Revolution and Terror. The alignments have shifted somewhat since then: Those in middle-class businesses and trades were associated with the left in 1789 France (and were so again during America's first Progressive movement at the end of the 19th century) but now tend to be associated with the right. Nevertheless, the designation has retained much of the notion that the right is associated with defending the status quo, whereas the left has pushed for change in the name of progress toward greater equality and fairness. We prefer the terms "left" and "right" here, rather than the terms "liberal" and "conservative," for multiple reasons. Jost (2021) has emphasized that the most enduring differences between left and right are attitudes toward change and inequality, with the left favoring change to reduce inequality.

Maintaining the status quo is the literal meaning of "conservative," that is, wishing to conserve the current arrangement. Modern conservatism is also widely associated with free markets and private-sector economic activity. Religiosity is not part of our definition of the political right.

The term "liberal" has reversed its meaning, which partly explains why conservative parties in some modern countries are named Liberals (e.g., The Netherlands, Australia). The term's literal meaning emphasizes freedom, which was the original goal. That included tolerance for diverse activities (which is still associated with liberalism) as well as freedom from government (which has reversed). The term "progressive" became popular in the late 1800s and early 1900s, referring to a more activist government, but when that lost credibility for a time, progressives appropriated the term "liberal." Recently, "liberal progressive" has become a popular term denoting the political left, which emphasizes tolerance for all low-status minorities as well as more government control and intervention in many aspects of life.

A major left-right difference is whether resources are distributed by the market or by the government (Friedman, 2017). Capitalism is a theory of marketplaces, though the full meaning encompasses the flow of money (capital) as well as goods and services. Socialism means collective government ownership. Theoretically this could extend to everything (as in communism, which abolishes private property), but modern socialists vary as to how many industries should be nationalized, so that many socialists would allow the "capitalistic private sector to continue existing to some

A definitional problem arises with long-term leftist governments who seek to retain the status quo. The resistance to change fits the definition of the conservative agenda, which is to "conserve" the current arrangements. The Chinese Communist Party has maintained its dominance for decades and resisted political change while allowing economic change in enabling capitalistic enterprise to flourish. It is rightist in the sense of wanting to conserve the status quo of its dominant power, but leftist in the sense that communism is the ultimate far-left ideology. And its promotion of domestic capitalism moves its economic theory to the right, though it seems that state-owned industries are still widely dominant.

Fascism seems mainly used as a term of abuse that is embraced by hardly any group for itself, and when it is embraced, it seems mainly to refer to group solidarity, which was its original meaning. Data about fascists and fascism are therefore essentially useless for developing the present theory about left-right differences in political ideology.

an explanation of what cultural societies do. We discuss the central hypothesis of our theory and provide evidence from several domains to support the theory. We discuss how our theory sheds light on important concepts such as privilege, morality, attitudes about time, and simplistic strategies for getting votes. Last, we offer some concluding comments, discuss theoretical and societal implications, mention some limitations of our theory, and offer some suggestions for future research directions.

Increasing Hostility and Polarization

This section covers evidence that left and right have recently become more antagonistic. Modern commentators

routinely remark on the increasing polarization and hostility between the political left and right in American society. Many institutions such as universities and news media that once prided themselves on respecting both sides of the political divide now instead take pride in their purity of devotion to only one side (Kiersz & Walker, 2014).

Research in political psychology has invoked the term "affective polarization" to describe the increasingly intense emotional attitudes toward parties and candidates. This view was espoused by Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes (2012) as an alternative to the assumption that the increase in political partisan hostility was driven by average citizens adopting ever more extreme policy views. Iyengar et al. suggested that instead of changes in political policies, the change was in emotions, based on increased identification with one's ingroup (i.e., one's political party) and demonization of the opponents (i.e., members of other political parties). They found that the changes toward increased mutual loathing were not consistently linked to policy attitudes. They speculated that this is rooted in negative political campaigning. Subsequent work by Iyengar and Westwood (2015) found that discrimination and hostility toward political opponents exceeded that associated with racial conflict. Nor was the hostility a matter of unconscious, automatic bias: The polarization was notably stronger with explicit than implicit measures.

Rogowski and Sutherland (2016) likewise note that there is lively dispute as to whether the average citizen has become more politically polarized—or remains ideologically moderate while developing more extreme emotional attitudes toward candidates who themselves are becoming more extreme and polarized. Their own research found that as candidates become more ideologically different, citizens developed more polarized affective evaluations of them. Not surprisingly, these trends were stronger among citizens who cared more about politics and who had stronger ideological commitments themselves. Luttig (2017) added that authoritarianism is an important driving factor. He found that authoritarianism was linked to partisan extremism in both Democrats and Republicans. In Luttig's view, authoritarianism is linked to a basic need to belong and a high desire for certainty, leading to idealizing one's ingroup and condemning the outgroup. As he concluded, "authoritarians (regardless of whether Democrat or Republican) gravitate toward the partisan extremes to fulfill their psychological needs for certainty and order" (p. 886) as well as a "powerful but substantively vacuous authoritarian need to belong" (p. 887). Thus, rising political extremism derives more from psychological motives than from sweeping changes in political philosophy. Meanwhile, the increasing extremity of politicians themselves was attested by Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Taddy (2019), who used machine learning methods to measure partisanship in congressional speech.

Increases in animosity and even hatred toward political opponents were recently documented by Finkel et al. (2020). Back in 1980, love for one's own political party was a considerably stronger sentiment than hate for the opposing party. But that balance has shifted, first around the end of the cold war (1990), and a further shift around 2010 brought it just past the break-even point. Since 2010, outparty hate has become ever stronger relative to in-party love. The change has been driven entirely by intensification of out-party hate, while in-party love remained roughly constant over the four decades.

Cultural Animal Theory as Context

This section provides context for our main theme by proposing that human evolution selected in favor of traits that facilitated culture (Baumeister, 2005; Rogers, 1988; Tooby & Cosmides, 1989). Cultural materialism theory (Harris, 1974, 1997) explains why such traits would be adaptive: Whatever else culture does, it must provide members with the resources needed to survive and reproduce. Baumeister (2005) proposed that the distinctively human psychological traits come from adaptations to make culture possible. The adaptive advantages of culture begin obviously with language and shared information but also include complex systems that profit by division of labor, accumulation of knowledge, and economic trade. This theory of humans as essentially "cultural animals" is akin to the more advanced theory of co-evolution of biology and culture (e.g., Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Henrich & Ensminger, 2014; Richerson & Boyd, 2005). For present purposes, the relevant point is that humans evolved to be able to create the kind of society that would improve survival and reproduction, indeed both quantity and quality of life. Biological success is measured by quantity of life, reflected in population increase. Advanced societies have moved beyond this to emphasize quality of life. As a revealing example, many people find life preferable with smaller families. In almost all rich and developed countries, as birth control became widely available (and child mortality declined), norms and patterns shifted toward smaller families. Putting these together, one function of culture to improve quantity and quality of life.

To be sure, some individuals are worse off because of culture. Capital punishment is an extreme example: Some societies do put some people to death, so obviously those individuals are worse off because of the culture. But in biological terms, what matters is simply that the overall population increases in size. For that, the society needs to ensure that lots of families have ample resources.

Cultures vary substantially, and the study of cultural differences has been a rich and lively enterprise for many decades. To complement such work, however, Buss (2001) called for more recognition of common patterns rather than just differences. He notes that cultures cannot shape human beings in any way that might happen to suit them, and in fact cultures are seriously constrained by human psychological traits. Yet all over the world, humans have developed cultural systems far in advance of what other animals have. The implication is that human evolution selected for traits that would be conducive to culture in a broad fashion.

The point of departure for our theorizing is the evolution-based argument that humans devised a novel solution to the basic biological challenges of survival and

reproduction. This novel solution has been characterized by Tooby and DeVore (1987) as a social-cognitive niche. That is, upon moving from forests to grasslands, instead of developing traits akin to the big cats that hunted in those areas, human evolution took a separate path based on social cooperation and sharing information (see also von Hippel, 2018, on evolution of a new kind of sociality). An attempt to form a post-Freudian systematic account of human psychology based on research findings concluded that the human psyche is highly suited to life in society with culture (Baumeister, 2005). The implication is that human evolution was guided by selection in favor of traits that enabled individuals to benefit from cultural society. These advances enabled societies to amass more resources, such as by group hunting, sharing information, and developing tools.

To be sure, culture is not a single thing but rather a combination of multiple processes, and so the human brain evolved with various specific mechanisms to facilitate social exchange and cooperation (Cosmides & Tooby, 1989; Tooby & Cosmides, 1989; Turchin, 2016), such as detecting cheaters who consume resources without contributing. Even the capacity for language required multiple evolutionary refinements, including moving the vocal apparatus, refinements to hearing toward better resolution instead of detection, and empowering the brain to use grammar and syntax.

Furthermore, Buss (2001) emphasized that culture is not an explanation by itself but rather must be understood in the context of individual animals relating to their physical environment. This point meshes with Rogers (1988) point that social learning is the basis for culture. He asserted that anthropologists largely agree that culture is learned socially, but he pointed out that a society would fail if all learning were social. That is, if no one is learning from the environment and people only learn from each other, their information will become obsolete. But culture is to be found in helping people deal with the physical environment, to afford them food, shelter, safety, and other life-enhancing resources including information. This brings us to cultural materialism.

If culture is indeed the strategy by which humankind solves the eternal basic problems of survival and reproduction, precisely how (by what means) does culture succeed at that? Harris's (1997) emphasis on material resources can be broken down heuristically to two essential tasks. First, resources must be produced or otherwise obtained, and then must be stored and protected—to an extent that surpasses what individuals could achieve working individually (Given competition among societies, it must also work better than alternative social systems). Making more resources available to a society will improve its quantity and quality of life. Second, resources must be distributed to most members of society. Spreading the wealth around enables the whole population to flourish, which is the test of a society and culture. The difference between these two tasks is the basis for our theory, as the next section will explain.

Central Hypothesis

The present argument's main point extends the previous section's emphasis that culture is fundamentally and almost universally concerned with two main jobs: (1) amassing resources, and (2) sharing resources through the group. Leaping ahead to the most recent century or two, the opposition between the political left and right is a matter of differential specialization with respect to those two main jobs of society.

This sets up the basic theme for our analysis of modern political partisanship. Essentially, each of the two political sides focuses on one of those functions and tends to neglect the other function. Specifically, the political right emphasizes the amassing of resources, whereas the political left emphasizes the sharing (redistributing) of resources.

Again, both functions are essential to a flourishing society. Yet the two jobs have grown apart and are to some extent at odds with each other. Indeed, the different emphases now extend to favoring different policies, invoking different moral standards of judgment, and even to some extent ending up at cross purposes in terms of how society should be organized for best results.

We readily concede that such a simple formulation glosses over countless complexities and undoubtedly some counterexamples. No doubt, political behavior and conflict are shaped and driven by multiple processes. Indeed, some political conflicts (e.g., death penalty, abortion rights, samesex marriage) are not directly linked to resources. We propose merely that our formulation is correct far more often than not—and that it offers considerable explanatory power. We hope that it might eventually serve as a basis for renewed respect between citizens of opposing views.

The idea was originally developed by considering which voters support which parties. In general, political rightist parties such as Republicans in the United States of America (USA) draw support from people who produce resources. Farmers and ranchers have long been very conservative and overwhelmingly tend to vote on the right (e.g., DeSilver, 2014; Kiersz & Walker, 2014). Businesspersons and merchants likewise tend to vote on the right (e.g., Kiersz & Walker, 2014). Bankers, who store resources (but also enable creation of resources by lending capital), also lean right (The Wall Street Journal, named for a geographical location associated with banking and investment, is regarded as a journalistic bastion of conservative, rightist views). Other professions that tend to vote right include building and construction workers; those involved in real estate; miners; people in the oil, gas, tobacco, and coal industries (Kiersz & Walker, 2014). Bonica (2014; see Murphy, 2018) also noted rightist tendencies in engineering, transport (e.g., trucking industry), and physicians. All of these professions provide resources to members of society. Military personnel tend to be conservative, and the military's modern avowed function is to protect resources, though historically (all the way back to the origins of civilization) military forces served to acquire resources, by raiding or conquering neighbors

¹We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out that despite their general conservatism, farmers are often happy to seek and accept government subsidies (thus redistribution), and some may indeed vote leftist when leftist candidates offer more generous farm subsidies, or perhaps for other reasons.

(Fukuyama, 2011). In short, it seems that resource producers lean to the right.

Meanwhile, the modern left's causes have emphasized redistribution. It began with the labor movement, which pushed to redistribute profits from owners to workers. The welfare state is widely regarded as the supreme achievement of the political left, and its essence is ensuring that everyone is taken care of with respect to basic needs, ideally from cradle to grave. To take care of people who cannot care for themselves, the government must redistribute resources from those who produce them to those who need them (and cannot produce or afford them). Affirmative action, another leftist innovation, redistributes opportunities to categories of citizens who have lacked opportunities. In general, helping the poor by means of government (rather than private charities, which the right favors) has been a major theme of leftist politics. The major successful contributions of the left involve sharing the wealth ever more broadly. It is noteworthy that the left has been very successful in moving the mainstream, so that many citizens who identify with the conservative right today accept such leftist causes as affirmative action, government-supported health care, the right of collective bargaining, wide availability of abortion and divorce, and same-sex marriage. Muller (1997) and others have noted the seeming irony that conservatives often end up trying to conserve institutions that they initially opposed when introduced by the left.

Support for the leftist (Democrat) party in the USA features groups who are less involved in producing resources and often more involved in redistribution of resources. Government workers, especially the unionized ones such as civil servants and teachers, are heavily Democrat. Many civil servants are involved in redistribution programs, which are supported by taxes (which are a form of redistribution). Other strong Democrat bastions are the universities (Kiersz & Walker, 2014), which do create some innovation but mostly are supported by externally created wealth, starting with their endowments or state government financing. Single mothers are another bastion (e.g., Lehmann-Haupt, 2020), as are minorities (e.g., Gramlich, 2020). Entertainers, including the film and music industries, lean strongly to the left (Murphy, 2018).

A prediction of our theory would be that support for the political left would be especially strong among poor people in rich countries. This is based on the left's emphasis on redistribution. Poor countries cannot redistribute that much because, being poor, they lack the wealth and resources to do so. Rich elites do not benefit from redistribution (though they may support it for moral or ideological reasons). Based on naked self-interest, poor people in rich countries stand to gain the most from redistribution. In our analysis, that would make them the natural supporters of leftist politics. To be sure, some poor people may vote differently for other reasons (Vance, 2016).

Our argument seems consistent with USA politics in the 2016 and 2020 elections. The Republicans took over the White House and Congress in 2016. They soon set about enacting business-friendly policies, aiming to stimulate growth in the economy (growth means amassing more resources): lowering taxes, reducing regulations. Business did seem to take off: The stock market hit unprecedented highs, and unemployment reached extreme lows (BBC, 2020). Then in 2020 the Democrats won both White House and Congress back. They quickly embarked on an ambitious multi-trillion-dollar redistribution plan, aiming to improve the lives of many categories of citizens (Mascaro & Freking, 2021). Taxes were increased to bring in funds to redistribute. These changes fit the view that the right's priorities involve economic growth for amassing resources and the left's priorities involve redistribution.

Some Relevant Psychological Processes

In this section we cover several psychological processes that may link the resource amassing versus redistributing difference to the political differences.

Change brings risk, as it disrupts many current working arrangements. Resource producers who depend on complex social systems have ample reason to fear change, because it can undermine or destroy systems that are working reasonably well. In contrast, change toward greater redistribution must seemingly downplay such risks. Choma, Hanoch, Hodson, and Gummerum (2014) reviewed a strong body of theoretical and empirical findings indicating that rightists tend to be more risk-averse in general than leftists. Choma et al.'s own data identified a revealing exception, however, which is that rightists were more tolerant than leftists of the financial risks required for a new business venture. It was not simply that rightists tolerated financial risk in general (For example, they did not show heightened tolerance for gambling). Rather, they seemed more accepting of the fact that starting a business—essentially, creating an organization to amass resources by providing goods or services that the public would willingly pay for-requires risk. Leftists, less familiar with how resources are produced, only approved of starting a business if the risk was low and the anticipated benefits were high, which of course is quite unusual.

Differential focus on the good versus the bad aspects of current society may also be relevant. Higgins (1998) has articulated this difference in terms of prevention versus promotion mindsets, and he characterized the prevention mindset as having a conservative bias (though his measures were not overtly political). If the present is largely satisfactory, the primary concern would be to prevent it from deteriorating. This view characterizes the conservative mindset (Muller, 1997). The fact that things have worked reasonably well is a reason to retain the status quo. In contrast, if the present is unsatisfactory or even just capable of substantial improvement, then the primary concern becomes how to promote such improvements. This view fits the liberal mindset: Things could and should be much better, and the top priority is how to bring about positive change.

A powerful extension of this difference by Sowell (2007) contrasted what he called constrained and unconstrained visions of human nature. Not only can society be made better, but people can become better, thereby facilitating the improvements in society. Contrasting early liberal and conservative writers, Sowell found that liberals embraced an unconstrained view of human improvement: Liberals see fewer limits to how much people may improve. Perfectibility does not mean achieving perfect human beings but merely improving toward that ideal. A long tradition including Rousseau, Godwin, and other writers proposed that people's selfish and destructive behaviors stemmed from the flaws in society and therefore could be reduced or eliminated by changing social conditions and educating people better. In contrast, conservatives tend to see humans as remaining largely as they are, including with such unhelpful traits as selfishness and shortsightedness. Conservative thought is therefore relatively constrained about the possibilities for improving society, because they think it is necessary to make concessions to human imperfection.

We wish to remain neutral but stipulate that both sides can point to some supportive evidence. For the left, the sweeping changes toward acceptance of homosexual love, extending to same-sex marriage, are one of many signs that a large population can be brought around toward greater tolerance (and, with same-sex marriage, wider distribution of rights). For the right, the failure of the Soviet Union, the Chinese Cultural Revolution, and other massive efforts to reform the psychology of individuals to create a so-called New Man who would enable their social system to flourish, and at a lower level the Soviet failure to get parents to consent to communal child-raising without parental favoritism, uphold Buss's (2001) view that human psychology is not fully malleable. To be sure, modern liberals may learn from past failures and potentially be more successful in the future than the Soviets were at molding human psychology toward its ideals.

We can cast Sowell's characterization in terms of amassing versus redistributing resources. Humans evolved from creatures who hardly shared resources at all, so each had to fend for itself. In a large modern society, some groups produce plenty of resources, others less so. All else being equal, the population would increase most from fully equal sharing. But all if all else is not equal, then the population benefit could be argued either way. This matters particularly if totally equal sharing reduces the amount of resources that are produced. That seems to be the case among the most current left-wing governments, such as North Korea, Cuba, and Venezuela. There are fewer total resources to go around. It is conceivable that the poorest, most unproductive segments of society would be worse off under equal sharing than with an incentive-based system, like an economic market.

Furthermore, even the difference in perceived constraints on human perfectibility could be linked to the amassingredistributing difference that we have emphasized. Amassing resources is a highly pragmatic affair and so must work with people as they are. Resource producers cannot afford to dwell on the possibility of revising the psychology of individuals. In contrast, redistribution is a morally elevated undertaking and is therefore more concerned with what could potentially be the best in the future.

Modern American business leaders sometimes embrace leftist values and priorities. A famous example was the Business Roundtable's (2019) Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation. It rejected the position espoused by Friedman's (1970) influential essay entitled "The social responsibility of a business is to increase its profits," also known as the shareholder doctrine. Following Adam Smith, Friedman explained that a corporation serves society best by pursuing profits (thereby increasing shareholder value). In contrast, the 2019 statement asserted that corporations also have duties to do well by their customers, employees, suppliers, and even communities at large. Many CEOs of major corporations signed the statement. This would seem to be an embrace of the unconstrained vision, in which companies voluntarily transform themselves to a higher level of morality so that society improves.

While many welcomed the Business Roundtable statement as a transformative moment in utopian progress, others thought it was nothing more than hypocritical blather aiming for good publicity or to disarm anti-business legislators. Two years after the statement was released, painstaking research by Bebchuk and Tallarita (2021) concluded that the signatories had not done anything different that might have realized the Statement's goals. Indeed, about 40 proposals had been submitted by shareholders as to how the various companies might change based on the Roundtable ideals, but all 40 had been rejected. The year-end proxy statements by the signing companies had mostly neglected to even mention the Roundtable Statement, and the few that did mention it did not indicate that any actual changes had occurred based on it.

Human Evolutionary Advances in both Amassing and **Sharing Resources**

Our argument thus far is that the human psyche evolved to participate in culture, which was adaptive based on amassing and redistributing resources. This argument would gain plausibility if human evolution included innovative forward steps in both of those. Somehow humankind seems to have managed both quite effectively overall, or at least succeeded enough to improve survival and reproduction outcomes. The increasing of average human life expectancy from about age 30 in a pre-modern world to about age 75 today (Roser, Ortiz-Ospina, & Ritchie, 2019a), and the relatively rapid ballooning of human world population from about 1 billion in 1800 to about 8 billion today (Roser, Ortiz-Ospina, & Ritchie, 2019b), are unparalleled among other mammals.

Innovations in Amassing Resources

Multiple improvements in amassing resources can be cited. The word culture was first used in connection with agriculture, a remarkable innovation that vastly expanded the food supply and hence local carrying capacities. Trade increases wealth, and trade is in fact much older than agriculture, indeed by an order of magnitude (Ridley, 2020). Even prior to trade, humans became the planet's most formidable hunters, not by dint of sharper fangs or faster legs, but by virtue of coordinated planning, communication, and weapons technology—thus cultural innovations in amassing resources.

Humans also far surpassed other species in terms of military organization. Fukuyama (2011) concluded that supporting a military organization was one of the key drivers in the formation of political states, given that the need for military protection is sufficiently compelling to persuade individual farmers to yield some of their crops as taxes. When one locality's crops failed, the main alternative to starvation was to send the men with spears to raid food from another farming village. Conversely, when those other villages sent their men with spears to take one's food, the alternative to starvation was to fight them off, which required having a defense force. Even before this, human groups developed systems of coordinated stone throwing that enabled them to drive a pride of feasting lions from their kill, appropriate the food, and drive off other predators and scavengers who might like to cut in on the feast (von Hippel, 2018). Turchin (2016) has likewise emphasized that military organization was an essential form of cooperation contributing to the advancement of society. Fighting groups were useful both for obtaining resources and defending them against marauders, and they often required people to cooperate with non-kin. In modern armies, of course, people cooperate with huge numbers of total strangers.

Innovations in Sharing Resources

The human innovations in sharing resources are no less impressive and consequential than the innovations in amassing resources. Sugiyama (2004) noted that prior to contact with civilization, 42% of human hunter-gatherers lived to age 50, as contrasted with only 9% of wild chimpanzees. This discrepancy is astounding in context of the generally accepted view that humans and chimpanzees share almost 99% of their DNA, so it is dubious that the difference can be explained by superior organ fitness. In Sugiyama's own research sample, most hunter-gatherers had at least once suffered an injury or serious illness that prevented foraging and would therefore have been lethal via starvation—except that other group members shared food and water with the temporarily incapacitated individuals, enabling them to survive and recover. Chimpanzees generally do not do this, so similar incapacitating injuries or illnesses prove fatal. The fact that over half his sample had suffered a disability lasting 30 days or more but were still alive indicates that the sharing of resources more than doubled the population in a single generation. Multiply that across generations and it helps explain why the human population is over 8 billion while the worldwide wild chimpanzee population is estimated to be less than 300,000 (World Wildlife Fund, 2021). The point is that the human innovation in sharing resources was substantially responsible for why the human population flourished while its genetic primate kin did not.

There are other important evolutionary advances in how humans distribute resources. Unlike other primates, human hunter-gatherer groups typically have established rituals for sharing big game and other food through the group, often even insisting that the person who made the kill does not supervise the distribution (Boehm, 1999; von Hippel, 2018). Taking turns, such as by waiting in queue, is another practice that humans use to provide access to resources, and it is essentially absent among non-human apes (Tomasello, 2016). Likewise, transforming adult males into providers of resources for not only their offspring but their offspring's mother is far beyond what apes do, but it has been an advantageous foundation for almost all human civilizations.

Thus, both sides of the political divide emphasize practices that were very important in the biological success of humankind, especially in contrast with the other apes. Human innovations in both amassing resources and distributing them enabled our ancestors to succeed.

Alternation in Power

Following Haidt (2012a), our argument proposes that both sides of the political spectrum have some valid points and make valuable contributions to society. This assertion gains plausibility insofar as successful countries alternate power between right and left (and presumably moderate rather than extreme versions of each; i.e., center-right and centerleft). If either side had a near monopoly on effective policies to make society thrive, it would presumably win most of the elections. At least, societies that did manage to keep electing the better party would flourish and thrive best. To be sure, there are other factors, and no doubt strong partisans suspect their opponents of winning elections by dishonest means. Indeed, later in this article we will propose different strategies by which left and right pander to voters. Still, ineffective and destructive philosophies of government should eventually be discredited, as seems to have been the case with totalitarian communism.

Early evidence of the pattern of alternation in power was provided by Schlesinger (1949), though he noted that yet earlier thinkers such as Thomas Jefferson had anticipated these views. Acknowledging that the major political parties have changed their views and policies (e.g., the Democrats were the pro-slavery and white supremacist political party in the 1800s, and the Republicans were progressive advocates of activist government reform during the first decade of the 20th century), he attempted to classify eras based on conservative versus liberal policies favored by presidents and governments. From 1765 to 1947 he delineated 11 periods, alternating between liberal and conservative dominance, averaging just under 17 years, with the biggest departures from that average occurring in the Civil War era (a brief liberal phase 1861-1869 and a long conservative period 1869-1901; see Schlesinger, 1949, pp. 80-85). His analysis gains some credibility by his willingness to predict the future, which he saw as likely conservative going forward through the 1950s until around 1962, then shifting liberal until about 1978. His predictions would seem to fit the conservative bent of the Eisenhower years, followed by the "Great Society" liberal progressivism of the 1960s and 1970s,

followed by the resurgence of conservativism during the Reagan years.

The United Nations Human Development Index ranks countries on quality and quantity of life, using criteria such as child mortality, longevity, education, and standard of living (see http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/latest-human-development-index-ranking). The top 10% of countries in these annual rankings have nearly all seen alternation in power during the past half century, with both center-left and center-right parties holding power for intermittent spells. In the USA, the past half century has seen the presidency held by 6 Republicans and 4 Democrats, and its Congress has often been dominated by the party that did not hold the presidency. The American electorate thus seems to consistently ensure that both parties are well represented in government.

To be sure, there are always exceptions, and not just Singapore. Japan and Mexico went through long periods of reelecting the same political party, though recently they have both had more alternation in power. Incumbency does offer electoral advantages (legal and otherwise), so one can dispute how free those choices are, but it does also seem that when one party delivers continuing prosperity and progress, voters may sometimes be content to reelect it. We note that many large USA cities have effectively employed one-party rule over this period; Chicago has not had a Republican mayor since 1931, San Francisco since 1964, nor Philadelphia since 1952.² Thus, one-party rule may succeed for a large city, especially if there are few internal conflicts such as unequal racial populations, but the flourishing countries that are large and diverse favor alternation in power.

We speculate, then, that successful societies tend toward alternation in power rather than long-term one-party rule. Multiple reasons can be suggested for this alternation in power. For example, Thomas Jefferson thought the causes might be biological, since half the population of adults dies off about every 18.7 years, and so a new generation with new attitudes takes over. Alternatively, complacency and corruption may increase over time, prompting the public to vote the ruling party out regardless of ideology. Schlesinger (1949) proposed that all parties and programs have flaws, which become more salient over time, eventually stoking the desire for a different governing party. He noted that the progressive New Deal phase ended roughly during the 1946 elections, in which the conservative Republican party campaigned with the simple slogan "Had enough?" Conversely, one slogan of Barack Obama during his successful 2008 election campaign was "Change We Need" or simply "Change."

Although these explanations may have merit, our analysis suggests an additional and potentially huge benefit of alternation in power: Over time, society will benefit from getting both the major jobs done (i.e., amassing resources and distributing resources). The right will enact legislation to favor economic growth, such as lowering taxes and reducing costly government regulation of business. The left will enact legislation to redistribute wealth and opportunities, so that the less affluent segments of society can enjoy a greater share of resources. Again, our theme is that both jobs are essential to a flourishing society, and alternation in power may be one mechanism by which this is achieved.

Explaining the Partisan Divide

Humans evolved in small foraging bands (e.g., Boehm, 1999; Fukuyama, 2011; von Hippel, 2018). In those bands, everyone except the youngest children participated in amassing food, and everyone received a share of it. How, then, did modern society lead to large groups in which amassing and distributing resources became separate?

No doubt one factor was the increasing specialization of larger societies. As a result, not everyone today participates in producing resources, nor is everyone involved in redistributing resources. People whose lives are centrally involved in one may have little or no contact with the other, and hence they may not understand how it works or sympathize with its importance. As we shall elaborate below, the two jobs foster different moral values, require different kinds of expertise, and invoke different psychological processes. When everyone was involved in both, it was perhaps easy to understand both. As different people specialize in one or the other, however, they lose that intuitive understanding, making it easier to regard their opponents as ignorant, incompetent, misguided, immoral, or even evil.

The lack of mutual understanding is evident in pundits' writings. Conservative op-ed writers frequently complained that President Obama's cabinet and other top appointees had very few people with experience in the private sector. They quickly began singing the same tune about President Biden, indeed even before he was inaugurated (e.g., Freeman, 2020). The point of their complaint was that the leftist government lacked people who had any understanding of the stresses and contingencies associated with how to make money by producing goods and services to benefit society. Conversely, leftist op-ed writers routinely decry Republican leaders for lacking empathy for the poor. The implication is that conservative governments may lack people sufficiently familiar with the need for redistribution of resources to the downtrodden. President Trump, for example, was periodically criticized as lacking empathy for poor minority citizens. The broader implication is that the people who make money and the people who redistribute money are no longer the same people and may lack understanding of what the other group does.

Modern economies exacerbate the problem far beyond merely not understanding what the other group does. In particular, nearly all modern economies succeed by incentives. People work to make money. But incentives inevitably create inequality-indeed that is built into their essential function: bigger rewards for better behavior. Incentives are thus inherently inimical to the left's ideal of equal sharing. This conflict is fundamental to social structure, in the sense that it cannot be resolved. Equal sharing of resources requires eliminating all incentives. The low productivity of communist societies presumably reflects the difficulty of

²Whether these cities serve as inspiring examples of effective one-party rule is debatable. All have been in the news recently for serious problems of finances and public safety.

motivating people to work hard without incentives. "We pretend to work, and they pretend to pay us" was a popular joke during the late days of the Soviet empire. The beneficial impact of incentives on societies is presumably one reason that some political philosophers have proposed evaluating a society's moral status not by its degree of inequality but rather by the standard of living of the bottom 10% of citizens (Rawls, 1996). By that metric, a highly unequal society can be morally justified if its poorest members live reasonably safe and comfortable lives.

In the modern world, with huge national and international economic systems, resources are increased by markets, and capitalistic ones seem to have thus far produced the most benefits to the populations, such as registered in societal standard of living (e.g., Bernstein, 2004; Fukuyama, 2015; Stark, 2014). Lower taxes increase the willingness to take big risks in startups, most of which fail but some of which improve society (and thereby earn a profit). Because most startups fail, the slight possibility of fabulous wealth is an appealing incentive, but prohibitive high-end taxes remove this. The successful new products and services improve society, which is reflected in people's willingness to spend their money for them. The investors and executives may get rich or at least see a gratifying return. But that creates inequality. Again, incentives by definition increase inequality. The practical question is therefore whether the benefits from improved behavior, innovation, and constructive risk taking are outweighed by the increase in inequality—or at least, where the optimal point along the continuum is.

Explaining Common and Controversial Phenomena Based on the Cultural Animal Analysis

Privilege

Privilege has been much discussed in the American national conversation recently. It is an important concept that may help explain why partisan hostility is increasing. The essential idea of privilege is that some people receive an unfairly good start in life. Again, this was not part of the huntergatherer evolutionary past but has intensified with the progress of civilization. In most modern societies, the privileged advantage starts with having parents who brought their child up well and launched their child into a relatively safe, happy, and prosperous life. Obviously rich parents can do that more easily than poor parents, though there are plenty of exceptions.

An analysis of 21 historical and contemporary populations found that a population's long-run level of inequality depends on the extent to which wealth is transmitted within families across generations (Mulder et al., 2009). Hunter-gatherer societies are highly egalitarian while having very little transmission of wealth across generations. Both inequality and intergenerational wealth transfer are much higher among farming and herding (and modern industrial)

All this is a kind of social trap, that is, a set of circumstances such that when they accidentally happen together it produces disaster (Platt, 1973). In this case, the disaster is the escalating hostility between the left and the right. The argument starts with the previous section's point, namely the benefits to society of incentives for doing things that help society thrive. Thus, the inventors of cars, dishwashers, and smartphones may have gotten rich, but given the benefits to society it seems collectively self-destructive if not churlish to begrudge them their profits. Offering incentives creates inequality but stimulates progress that can benefit the whole group, and thus most of its members. In simple modern terms, people work hard for money, and to get them to work hard, it is necessary to give them money.

The problems begin when people pass these benefits on to their children. The children have not achieved or contributed anything, but their lives and prospects are much better than those of other children. Their parents give them a good start in life and provide a safety net if the children fall into trouble. Other children, equally new and innocent, are not given these advantages or safety nets. This is fundamentally unfair. Each child should morally be entitled to the same chances in life.

Privilege thus starts with effective parenting, and it can benefit children who themselves have indifferent capabilities and low attainments, thus undeserving but lucky in having well-to-do parents. The moral problem increases with each new generation that continues to get the benefit of the achievements by the original patriarch or matriarch who created the family fortune. The privileged advantage may well be passed down to great-grandchildren and even beyond. This is fundamentally unfair to other newborn children, whose great-grandparents failed to amass a family fortune. It is especially unfair if their great-grandparents' opportunities were unfairly constrained by race, class, war, epidemics, or local economic collapse.

One question our theory seeks to address is why is partisan hostility increasing recently? Part of the answer is that the moral unfairness of privilege increases over time, as each generation of parents still manages to pass on some advantages to their children. Moreover, if effects are cumulative, they could spread further over multiple generations, thus unfairly privileging some children over others by ever wider margins. In a survey of political development and history, Fukuyama (2015) observed that "The problem of inherited advantages usually increases over time" (p. 114 of 1234). This problem may be purely moral or both moral and economic. Even if subsequent generations slowly regress toward the mean, thus losing wealth, inherited privilege loses its legitimacy as generations move farther from the person who created the wealth. To be sure, some successors may leverage their privileged start into a successful career that increases the wealth, thus again increasing inequality.

One possible social policy would eliminate privilege, by preventing parents from providing any unequal benefits to their children, or by taxing the inheritance all away so parents could not leave wealth to their children. Such policies are a morally admirable step toward eliminating privilege to increase fairness and equality. But in practice (e.g., during the brief period of collective parenting in the Soviet

Union) they have not succeeded very well, possibly because making a better life for one's children is an important incentive that motivates talented people to work and contribute to society. We speculate that societies may have flourished better by exploiting rather than stifling the parental impulse to give one's child a good start in life. But, again, this creates unequal privilege, which becomes increasingly unfair with each new generation that enjoys inherited wealth without itself having contributed or achieved anything.

Again, this is an unsolvable problem that likely increases over time. Some parents will give their children a better start than others. Should they be prohibited from giving their children computers, or piano lessons, or math tutoring? The logical extension of such a policy would be that upper-class and middle-class parents should be prevented from giving their children any advantage that lower-class parents fail to provide. We can appreciate the arguments for the moral superiority of such a policy, in terms of equality and fairness, but we also speculate that such a policy would be destructive to a society in terms of its long-term economic growth and achievement.

Morality

Haidt's (2012a) analysis of political conflict was stimulated by his discovery that left and right differed in their moral emphases. In many respects, politics is a kind of applied morality. Hence moral differences may contribute to partisan hostility, insofar as each group sees the other as not merely having different self-interest but as acting immorally. Friedman (2002) observed that moral rules and legal laws generally discourage the same sorts of behaviors (e.g., stealing, fraud, illicit sex). He said the long-term trend in most societies is a gradual shift from relying on morality to relying on laws. No doubt one factor was advances in law enforcement. But the demand for those advances needs explaining. Friedman said morality can work well in a small group (like an extended family or small tribe) in which everybody knows each other. But the motivation depends on concern with reputation. In big cities, people often interact with strangers, and so the reputational deterrent of morality is weakened. Hence a large society needs law enforcement. The motivation to do what's right is no longer based solely on preserving one's good name but is powerfully augmented by fear of getting arrested.

Morality is traditionally one of the so-called weapons of the weak, that is, an interpersonal device that enables people lacking formal power to get their way (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994). Condemnation of political opponents as immoral has long been an effective tactic, especially in a democracy with a morally sensitive electorate. In a pair of studies analyzing American Congressional speeches and Twitter messages, Wang and Inbar (2021) confirmed that moral language is used more often by the out-of-power party than the currently dominant one. Both parties exhibited such shifts. The main exception was that the majority party used more moral language invoking obedience and respect for authority figures. In retrospect, it is intuitively plausible that people who hold power selectively extoll those particular virtues, which would facilitate their own exercise of power. In general, however, the out-of-power party uses morality as a tool to sway voters to its side.

We assume nearly all people across the political spectrum accept the positive moral value of fairness, and indeed Haidt's (2012a) work confirmed that fairness is an important value to both he left and the right. However, there is ample room for disagreement about what is fair. In particular, two standard but different notions of fairness are equality and equity. Equality assigns the same amounts of resources to everyone. Equity,3 in contrast, assigns larger rewards to some people than others, usually based on their having contributed more. As examples, most modern marriages embrace the ideal of equality, such that both spouses should be equally valued, their careers equally supported, and resources shared equally between them. In contrast, we know of no major corporation that pays all its employees the same salary. Instead, they pay the highest salaries to their most important and valued workers, who contribute the most to the company's success (Admittedly, in practice, other factors do intrude and so both marriages and corporations fall short of those ideals).

Our impression is that most people on both left and right agree that fairness is important and that people who are temporarily unable to provide for themselves should be helped. Put another way, they agree on helping the deserving poor and agree in not wishing to support freeloaders. Where they disagree may lie in the relative proportions of deserving poor versus freeloaders. Choma, Barnes, Braun, and Hanoch (2018) found such differences with the Affordable Care Act (nicknamed Obamacare): Conservatives perceived less deservingness overall and hence were less supportive of it. Aarøe and Petersen (2014) showed that large population differences in support for redistribution can be eliminated simply by providing cues depicting the recipients as either undeserving (lazy) or deserving (unlucky).

There may be important tradeoffs when it comes to concepts like equity and equality. For example, the title of one article is "Inequity in equity: How 'equity' can lead to inequity for high-potential students" (Benbow & Stanley, 1996). The authors argue that egalitarianism within American society and schools pits equality against excellence rather than promoting both, which can lead to antiintellectualism, the 'dumbing down' of the curriculum, and equating aptitude and achievement testing with elitism.

Hence a first moral prediction is that the political left will place more emphasis on equality, whereas the right will place more emphasis on equity (in the traditional sense of unequal rewards proportional to unequal achievement and contribution). Equality is the ideal for sharing: Everyone should have the same resources and opportunities. In contrast, producing resources often depends on incentives for

³We use the term "equity" in its standard social science sense, but we note that recently the political left has begun to use the term with a different meaning, calling for redistribution. In our usage, equity means rewards and resources are bestowed proportionally to achievement and contribution to aroup success.

hard work, and so the right's focus on amassing resources benefits from equitable incentives.

Likewise, cooperation is positively valued across the political spectrum. Haidt (2012a) noted that humans are the "world champions of cooperation," given that they cooperate far more than other species (see also Turchin, 2016). Cooperation can be understood as two or more people interacting in a manner that carries some cost or risk but that is intended to produce a positive-sum outcome. Again, though, left and right may emphasize different forms of cooperation. To the left, altruistic helping is a supreme virtue, insofar as those who have resources freely donate or sacrifice to benefit others who have less. The positive-sum aspect of helping was recently confirmed in multiple studies that found the cost to the helper was consistently less than the benefit to the recipient (Ent, Sjåstad, von Hippel, & Baumeister, 2020). The Sugiyama (2004) findings cited previously make this point dramatically: giving food to sick or injured friends costs only the effort of obtaining that food while saving the life of the friend—the benefit thus far vaster than the cost. The virtue underlying such helping indicates an underlying attitude that values the welfare of others above one's selfish amassing of resources.

In contrast, cooperation in resource production depends on a different sort of virtue. Altruistic, self-sacrificing generosity is not needed but rather a reliable trustworthiness to do one's part honestly. In group hunts, or indeed in group battles, everyone had to rely on the others to do their part. Chimpanzees engage in group hunting, but each is mainly out for itself, and the one who captures the prey tries to consume as much as possible before the others come and try to grab or wheedle a piece (Tomasello, 2016). In contrast, human hunting groups achieved much greater success by division of labor supported by agreements to share the proceeds. For example, some members might make noise to drive the prey toward the others, who trap and kill it. This would not work for chimpanzees because the everyone would want to be a killer rather than a noisemaker—because noisemakers would get no food. Only humans manage to make and keep the agreement that the noisemakers will get a sufficient share. Such agreements enabled humans to become the highly effective hunters.

The morality of the economic marketplace requires performing one's role effectively enough, so that if everyone also does, resources will be increased: The moral duty is to go to work every day and do your job in an honest, fair, ethical, and competent manner. If this virtue prevails across the group, resources will be created.

Trade is also a positive-sum arrangement. A trade is made because both the buyer and the seller are better off because of the trade. The relevant virtue is honest, fair dealing, as opposed to misrepresenting the value of what one gives up. To be sure, dishonesty has often intruded into trade, but the presumption of honesty (nowadays backed up by government enforcement) enables trade to occur with benefits to both parties. All economic transactions require at least some degree of trust (Arrow, 1974; Williamson, 1993). Trade is widely beneficial, as all works on economic history

confirm (e.g., Bernstein, 2004). It can also survive some rate of exploitative dishonesty. But when too much selfish dishonesty undermines trust, then trade is stifled, and the society is worse off. The importance of trust, often backed by government enforcement, is apparent in the illegal drug business. Lower trust is a serious impediment to such transactions, which otherwise could be extremely profitable to all concerned (e.g., Vranceanu, Sutan, & Dubart, 2012). Indeed, some scholars call trustworthiness an "economic asset" (Wilson & Kennedy, 1999).

Hence a further difference in moral emphasis concerns the balance between rights and responsibilities. Although rights and responsibilities are recognized across the political spectrum, our analysis suggests that the political left will focus more on rights, whereas the political right will focus more on responsibilities and duties. The left's task of promoting redistribution is best served by emphasizing that people have rights and are therefore entitled to be given a greater share of society's resources, including receiving services paid for by others. For example, one study found that Democrats attached more importance to rights for political participation and for minority groups than did Republicans (Coffé & Bolzendahl, 2011). In contrast, the political right focuses on producing, storing, and protecting resources, and success at those depends on many different people performing their duties responsibly.

Big Five personality differences provide some support. Goldberg and Rosolack (1994) reported that conservatives outscored liberals on conscientiousness, which would fit the rightist emphasis on doing one's duty and performing one's role in the system. Meanwhile, liberals outscored conservatives on openness to experience, which would fit the left's greater acceptance of change.

Attitudes about Time

The left and right differ profoundly in how they address time. This is to be expected given the fundamental difference between left and right in terms of their attitudes toward change (the left is far more favorable toward change than the right; e.g., Jost, 2021; Lassetter & Neel, 2019). Robinson, Cassidy, Boyd, and Fetterman (2015) used textual analysis to compare the use of past versus future usages in conservative and liberal webpages. They found conservative posts referred to the past more frequently than the future, whereas liberal posts referred to the future more frequently than the past.

The difference in time perspective is rooted in the view that left and right disagree as to how to achieve the best possible society. The left tends to think that continued and sweeping improvements, including to the psychology of individual members, can and should be implemented to achieve something truly wonderful. The right is skeptical that such changes will indeed bring utopia and may indeed produce problems, and so its formula starts with preserving what has worked thus far. The left is in an important sense far more optimistic than the right about improving human



nature so that people will become unselfish and publicspirited.

Future

The rightist, almost by definition, looks forward to a future that is similar to the present (and usually better than the past, though incrementally so). The leftist, again almost by definition, looks forward to a future that will be very different from and much better than the present and past, indeed sometimes radically so. People who like continuity consider the present to be good, and fear change toward a very different future will not be drawn to radically idealistic policies such as the "Green New Deal."

Past

Rightist and leftist attitudes toward the past are also different. Keeping the future the same often connects not just with the present but also with the past. Tradition has more authority power with the right than the left (e.g., Blee & Creasap, 2010; van der Toorn, Jost, Packer, Noorbaloochi, & Van Bavel, 2017). For resource producers, the past is where methods and systems were developed to create more resources, to make money. A bigger pie means that bigger pieces of it are in principle available to most. Those on the political right have a sense, whether correct or incorrect, that it is difficult to set up such productive systems and so rightists are reluctant to tinker with it because changing it might ruin it. There is a legitimate pragmatic argument for retaining successful systems, though it may also be exaggerated, idealized, and/or exploited as myth. Muller's (1997) authoritative introduction to conservative thought emphasizes that conservatives regard past success as a strong reason for preserving institutions.

In contrast, the left starts with the present and its pervasive, unfair inequality. Insofar as the past is relevant, it is where the unfairness originated, presumably because one group of people was immoral and therefore oppressed another group. The reason one group has more resources than another is because the first group did something bad in the past, so it is morally virtuous and proper to redistribute. The narrative is often important because of the issue of deservingness. Both leftists and rightists agree that the deserving poor should be helped. Both also generally agree that freeloaders should not be supported by others. In surveys (e.g., Smith, 2017), for example, Republicans and Democrats give very different answers to the basic question: What makes someone rich or poor? Most Republicans think a person's level of wealth is mostly due to the person's own hard work (or the lack of it). In contrast, most Democrats say that whether someone is rich or poor is mostly due to circumstances beyond their control.

In some objective sense, the present is the same for the political leftists and rightists. Presumably they both recognize many of its common features, even though they may argue about how to interpret them. Importantly, they may view the present differently because of comparing it to different standards.

In a sense, taking the present as it is suits the right, to some degree, but the left envisions a different and more equal distribution of resources. The right resists change: The present is good enough as it is (This is caricature, to be sure: Specific improvements are widely imagined and sometimes advocated. Nevertheless, the essence of conservatism is to conserve what is good in the present). The left succeeds best by getting people to recognize the present as intolerable and unconscionable, so they will approve more redistribution.

A crucial difference is the comparator. On the right, they see the present in comparison to a (partly imaginary) distant past of anarchy and chaos—and perhaps a future possibly much worse than the present. They focus on how hard it has been to get just to the present, and so they do not want to jeopardize that. In contrast, on the left they look at the present in contrast to an envisioned future that is much better, and so they see the present as sadly deficient. This contrast fits the view that the most basic difference between left and right is attitude toward change, that conservatism is essentially to resist change, and leftist progressivism is about more change (Jost, 2021). Comparing the present to an envisioned future ideal justifies all sorts of immediate changes, whereas respecting what has been established in comparison to a chaotic (and therefore miserable) past creates the view that change should be regarded skeptically and only done with care and caution.

Vote-Getting Strategies

In modern society and democracy, the two parties compete for votes, and losing too many elections often calls for new strategies for widening the party's appeal. We like to think that this will lead to thoughtful reflections on how best to contribute to the betterment of society, but no doubt some strategies will involve simpler strategies to attract voters. Many such methods are used; here we focus specifically on the ones relevant to our central hypothesis.

The right focuses on making money, and so its strategic efforts to attract voters would take two forms designed to appeal based on the promise of more money for its supporters: (1) increasing incentives and (2) reducing government regulations. Lowering taxes is a common promise by the right. This appeals to voters who expect to have more money themselves as individuals to spend despite having the same gross income. Essentially, lowering taxes increases the incentives, insofar as people keep more of their earnings. At the group level, the right promises to increase growth by cutting back on government regulations of business. Without question, businesses can flourish more profitably with less government regulation, though without regulation various abuses and ill effects (e.g., environmental pollution, misleading marketing, racial discrimination) increase.

The left can also try to get votes by offering money, but also by focusing more on redistribution than on growth. Given that most countries have far more poor than rich people, the left may seek votes by promising to transfer more wealth from the rich to the poor. The moral case can be supported by pointing out the unfairness of the current distribution of wealth and suggesting the wealthy do not pay their fair share. Other redistributive strategies can include expanding government services and increasing subsidies to favored groups.

Courting votes can also take the form of stirring outrage, which might motivate supporters to vote. Many bases for outrage can be identified, such as sex scandals, but again we focus on issues relevant to our central hypothesis, that is, what favorite villains will be differentially emphasized. The right's emphasis on producing resources would lead to featuring villains who fail to contribute resources and instead live off the hard work of others, such as so-called "welfare queens" and other poor people who ostensibly exploit the governmental redistribution system to support themselves in comfort based on money transferred from hard-working taxpayers.

The left's preferred villains have changed somewhat with the times. The greedy capitalist remains a favorite villain, insofar as such people refuse to share their ostensibly vast and possibly ill-gotten fortunes. In Marxist theory, capitalists were seen as fat cats who did little or no work themselves and simply exploited the hard work of laborers to support their luxurious, idle lifestyle. In that sense, the reproach resembles that of the rightists' demonization of "welfare queens:" Both groups propose that some people live comfortable, easy lives supported by the hard work of others. Today, however, relatively few Americans today can sustain a wealthy lifestyle without working, so the idleness aspect is harder to emphasize. Nevertheless, the vast fortunes some people make seem disproportionate. The former presidential candidate Bernie Sanders, for example, was quoted as saying that every billionaire is a shameful sign of policy failure, and indeed that none of them should exist (Kaplan, 2019). Some fortunate individuals happen to have the right stuff at the right place and at the right time, and they become inordinately rich, arguably far beyond what their objective achievements and contributions merit. And as noted above, the unfairness intensifies when these people pass along advantages and resources to their children, who clearly have done nothing to create the wealth from which they benefit.

Summary and Conclusion

Invoking the philosopher John Stuart Mill, Haidt (2012b) wrote that with regard to political differences, both sides are correct about the things they care most about. Our analysis builds on that insight, proposing that much ostensible conflict between left and right arises because they have different values and priorities and mistakenly see their political opponents as mainly and essentially opposed to their values, whereas in fact they are focused on different values, different ways of making society better.

To summarize our argument: The biological success of humankind, as reflected in its impressive increase in quantity and quality of life, stems from new modes of mutually beneficial interaction. Culture is the culmination and foremost mechanism of this, and humans evolved their distinctive psychological traits because these enabled them to benefit from cultural systems. The groups who made the societies that most successfully solved the problems of survival and reproduction became our ancestors. These societies did (at least) two things effectively: (1) amassing resources, and (2) sharing resources through the group. Back in the evolutionary past, most adults took part in both tasks, but the two tasks have grown apart, and in the modern world they pull against each other. Nevertheless, both tasks are important, indeed essential, for a flourishing society.

Our central argument is that the modern political right focuses on amassing resources, whereas the political left focuses on redistributing those resources. Conflict intensifies not merely because the groups fail to understand each other, but also because of economic systems. In world history, resources have generally increased most in societies that capitalized on trade and market competition. Economic systems produce benefits by using incentives—but incentives, by definition, increase inequality. Finding an ideal balance between the modern political right's devotion to marketplace incentives to achieve economic growth of resources and the political left's devotion to distributing the resources equally for the benefit of all is a central challenge. The result can be a healthy dialectic, marked by sharing or alternation of government power between center-left and center-right. The former enacts policies to increase redistribution of resources, whereas the latter enacts policies to increase growth. An unsolvable problem that societies will hence always struggle with is that of privilege: Successful parents will confer resources on their offspring that the children themselves have not earned, giving richer children an unfair advantage over poorer children.

Theoretical Implications

This article expands the domain of cultural animal theory (Baumeister, 2005) to understanding political conflict. In particular, it breaks down the simple formulation that culture improves survival and reproduction, by considering the two components (amassing and redistributing resources). Furthermore, the distinctive psychological changes that set humans apart from other animals can be predicted and interpreted in terms of facilitating the new ways of amassing and sharing resources that humans adopted.

Societal Implications

Political opponents naturally regard each other as enemies and have no direct incentive to cooperate for the good of society. Still, it is possible that understanding that one's opponent is also performing a task that serves society's best interest might reduce some knee-jerk hostility and destructive obstructionism. Meanwhile, ordinary citizens and the press might ameliorate conflict by recognizing and rewarding politicians who do manage to cooperate with opponents.



Limitations

We acknowledge that our analysis is USA-centric. Although the USA has several "third parties" (e.g., Constitution, Green, Libertarian, Natural Law, Reform, Socialist), American electoral history has usually been primarily a twoparty contest. In many other countries, there are more major parties and more turnover in these parties (To be sure, in many such cases there is nevertheless a dominant pair of center-right and center-left parties). Political partisanship may be more severe in countries with just two major parties than in countries that have several major political parties.

We also reiterate that our theory does not seek to explain all political conflict. Some bitter and polarizing conflicts are about values, such as the debates about the death penalty, abortion, and critical race theory. Most broadly, we readily acknowledge that multiple independent processes are at work in political conflict, and we have only analyzed one of them.

In the mid twentieth century, the two American parties were less polarized than now, including conservative Democrats and liberal Republicans. This could be taken to suggest that our characterization has only recently emerged. Contrary to that, however, we note the left's focus on redistribution has been in place much longer, as has the right's focus on resource production. To resolve this, we suggest that both parties long have had some interest in both amassing and redistributing resources, but even then had different emphases. The conservative Democrats and liberal Republicans were minorities within their parties. Party identification is of course affected by many things other than current policy sentiments, such as family and friendship networks and status quo biases. The recent polarization is thus not a sign that parties have brand-new policy differences, but rather a result of gradually removing those minorities from influential positions. Liberal Republicans and conservative Democrats once functioned to pull their respective parties toward the center, but after the polarizing shakeout they are no longer able to do this.

Future Research

We hope our theory will stimulate further research that will undoubtedly refine and improve its basic ideas. There are several possible future research directions. We proposed that the differential emphasis on amassing versus redistributing resources would generate predictions about how left and right would think, feel, and act. There was evidence in support of these, but much more systematic and rigorous testing would be desirable. Insofar as the political right is focused on amassing resources and the left is focused on redistributing resources, there should be discernible differences in moral values, demonized villains, in attitudes toward past/present/future, and in strategies for attracting voters when desperate and/or unscrupulous. We proposed that poor people in rich countries would generally be staunch leftists, as they stand to gain most by redistribution.

Whether the left and right really do serve their functions effectively is also open to question. Republican administrations do reduce government regulation, which spurs economic growth for a time but also permits abuses that lead to crashes, most spectacularly in 1929 and 2009.

Concluding Remarks

Partisans of the left and right may both think that society's well-being would be maximized if their favored party were to win all elections and thus hold permanent and thorough power. Against that view, we put forward the no doubt unpopular view that the health and well-being of a modern society will be best served by having at least two viable political parties who can share or alternate power. Hating and demonizing each other is unlikely to facilitate cooperation. Although future and probably endless continued disagreement is likely, perhaps it could be sustained in a more cooperative spirit of mutual respect and even appreciation. Our theory offers a hopeful basis for left and right to understand and perhaps appreciate each other somewhat better than currently prevails. It suggests why alternation in power and occasional, respectful, interparty cooperation would be best for society. Society needs constant updating so as best to achieve economic growth and to share that growth so most members of society are better off. This is what makes a strong society. The sooner both leftists and rightists recognize this, the better off all will be. We hope our theoretical perspective helps bridge the gap between the political extremes.

We do not expect staunch partisans of left and right to change their views to agree with their opponents. But perhaps the present analysis would enable them to say, we still think we are right, but we recognize that you do have a valid point too. Mutual respect may be a vital prerequisite for cooperation. Perhaps this theory could foster mutual respect.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Golnoosh Behrouzian for her assistance with this article. We thank Cory Clark and Yoel Inbar for comments on a preliminary draft.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

References

Aarøe, L., & Petersen, M. B. (2014). Scandinavians and Americans agree on social welfare in the face of deservingness cues. The Journal of Politics, 76(3), 684-697. doi:10.1017/S002238161400019X

Arrow, K. J. (1974). The limits of organization. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

Baumeister, R. F. (2005). The cultural animal: Human nature, meaning, and social life. New York: Oxford University Press.



- Baumeister, R. F., Stillwell, A. M., & Heatherton, T. F. (1994). Guilt: An interpersonal approach. Psychological Bulletin, 115(2), 243-267. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.115.2.243
- BBC. (2020, November 3). US 2020 election: The economy under Trump in six charts. BBC News. Retrieved from https://www.bbc. com/news/world-45827430.
- Bebchuk, L. A., & Tallarita, R. (2021). Will Corporations Deliver Value to All Stakeholders? Vanderbilt Law Review, 75(2), 1031-1091. doi: 10.2139/ssrn.3899421
- Benbow, C. P., & Stanley, J. C. (1996). Inequity in equity: How "equity" can lead to inequity for high-potential students. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 2(2), 249-292. doi:10.1037/1076-8971.2.2.249
- Bernstein, W. J. (2004). The birth of plenty: How the prosperity of the modern world was created. Camden, ME: International Marine.
- Blee, K. M., & Creasap, K. A. (2010). Conservative and right-wing movements. Annual Review of Sociology, 36(1), 269-286. doi:10. 1146/annurev.soc.012809.102602
- Boehm, C. (1999). Hierarchy in the forest: The evolution of egalitarian behavior. Cambridge, MA: Harvard.
- Bonica, A. (2014). Mapping the ideological marketplace. American Journal of Political Science, 58(2), 367-386. doi:10.1111/ajps.12062
- Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. J. (1985). Culture and the evolutionary process. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Buss, D. M. (2001). Human nature and culture: An evolutionary psychological perspective. Journal of Personality, 69(6), 955-978. doi:10. 1111/1467-6494.696171
- Choma, B. L., Hanoch, Y., Hodson, G., & Gummerum, M. (2014). Risk propensity among liberals and conservatives: The effect of risk perception, expected benefits, and risk domain. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 5(6), 713-721. doi:10.1177/1948550613519682
- Choma, B. L., Barnes, A. J., Braun, R. T., & Hanoch, Y. (2018). Dissecting the politics of "Obamacare": The role of distributive justice, deservingness, and affect. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 48(11), 634–642. doi:10.1111/jasp.12553
- Coffé, H., & Bolzendahl, C. (2011). Partisan cleavages in the importance of citizenship rights and responsibilities. Social Science Quarterly, 92(3), 656-674. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6237.2011.00786.x
- Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (1989). Evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture: II Case study: A computational theory of social exchange. Ethology and Sociobiology, 10(1-3), 51-97. doi:10. 1016/0162-3095(89)90013-7
- DeSilver, D. (2014, July 1). A closer look at who identifies as Democrat and Republican. Pew Research Center. Retrieved from https://www. pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/07/01/a-closer-look-at-who-identifies-as-democrat-and-republican/.
- Ent, M. R., Sjåstad, H., von Hippel, W., & Baumeister, R. F. (2020). Helping behavior is non-zero-sum: Helper and recipient autobiographical accounts of help. Evolution and Human Behavior. 41(3), 210-217. doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2020.02.004
- Finkel, E. J., Bail, C. A., Cikara, M., Ditto, P. H., Iyengar, S., Klar, S., ... Druckman, J. N. (2020). Political sectarianism in America. Science, 370(6516), 533-536. doi:10.1126/science.abe1715
- Freeman, J. (2020, December 28). Can Bernie Sanders find happiness? Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from https://www.wsj.com/articles/ can-bernie-sanders-find-happiness-11609193851?mod=opinion_lead_
- Friedman, L. M. (2002). Law in America: A short history. New York: Modern Library.
- Friedman, M. (1970, September 13). A Friedman doctrine: The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits. The New York from https://www.nytimes.com/1970/09/13/ Retrieved archives/a-friedman-doctrine-the-social-responsibility-of-business-is-
- Friedman, M. (2017). Milton Friedman: Old school liberalism. Hoover Institution. Retrieved from https://www.hoover.org/research/miltonfriedman-old-school-liberalism.
- Fukuyama, F. (2011). The origins of political order: From prehuman times to the French Revolution. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Girou.

- Fukuyama, F. (2015). Political order and political decay: From the industrial revolution to the globalization of democracy. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Fukuyama, F. (2018). Identity: The demand for dignity and the politics of resentment. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Gentzkow, M., Shapiro, J. M., & Taddy, M. (2019). Measuring group differences in high-dimensional choices: Method and application to Congressional speech. Econometrica, 87(4), 1307-1340. doi:10.3982/ ECTA16566
- Goldberg, J. (2009). Liberal fascism: The secret history of the American left, from Mussolini to the politics of change. New York: Broadway Books.
- Goldberg, L. R., & Rosolack, T. K. (1994). The Big Five factor structure as an integrative framework: An empirical comparison with Eysenck's PEN model. In C. Halverson, G. Kohnstamm, & R. Martin (Eds.), The developing structure of temperament and personality from infancy to adulthood (pp. 7-35). New York: Erlbaum.
- Gramlich, J. (2020, October 26). What the 2020 electorate looks like by party, race and ethnicity, age, education and religion. Pew Research Center. Retrieved from https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/ 10/26/what-the-2020-electorate-looks-like-by-party-race-and-ethnicity-age-education-and-religion/.
- Haidt, J. (2012a). The righteous mind: Why good people are divided by politics and religion. New York: Pantheon.
- Haidt, J. (2012b, November 7). We need a little fear. The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/07/opinion/after-the-election-fear-is-our-only-chance-at-unity.html.
- Harris, M. (1974). Cows, pigs, wars, and witches: The riddles of culture. New York: Random House.
- Harris, M. (1997). Culture, people, nature. Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Henrich, J., & Ensminger, J. (2014). Theoretical foundations: The coevolution of social norms, intrinsic motivation, markets, and the institutions of complex societies. In J. Ensminger & J. Henrich (Eds.), Experimenting with social norms: Fairness and punishment in cross-cultural perspective (pp. 19-44). New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Higgins, E. T. (1998). Promotion and prevention as a motivational principle. In M. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 30, pp. 1-46). New York: Academic.
- Iyengar, S., Sood, G., & Lelkes, Y. (2012). Affect, not ideology: A social identity perspective on polarization. Public Opinion Quarterly, 76(3), 405-431. doi:10.1093/poq/nfs038
- Iyengar, S., & Westwood, S. J. (2015). Fear and loathing across party lines: New evidence on group polarization. American Journal of Political Science, 59(3), 690-707.
- Jost, J. T. (2021). Left & right: The psychological significance of a political distinction. New York: Oxford.
- Kaplan, T. (2019, September 24). Bernie Sanders Proposes a Wealth Tax: 'I Don't Think That Billionaires Should Exist'. The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/24/us/politics/bernie-sanders-wealth-tax.html?smid=tw-nytpolitics&smtyp=
- Kiersz, A., & Walker, H. (2014, November 3). These charts show the political bias of workers in each profession. Business Insider. Retrieved from https://www.businessinsider.com/charts-show-thepolitical-bias-of-each-profession-2014-11.
- Lassetter, B., & Neel, R. (2019). Malleable liberals and fixed conservatives? Political orientation shapes perceived ability to change. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 82, 141-151. doi:10.1016/ j.jesp.2019.01.002
- Lehmann-Haupt, R. (2020, October 14). Democrats' new super power: Single parents like me are a growing political force. USA Today. Retrieved from https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/voices/ 2020/10/14/single-mom-parents-children-democratic-voters-bidenharris-column/3629110001/.
- Lipka, M. (2016, February 23). U.S. religious groups and their political leanings. Pew Research Center. Retrieved from https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/02/23/u-s-religious-groups-and-their-political-leanings/.



- Luttig, M. D. (2017). Authoritarianism and affective polarization: A new view on the origins of partisan extremism. Public Opinion Quarterly, 81(4), 866-895. doi:10.1093/poq/nfx023
- Mascaro, L., & Freking, K. (2021, August 25). House passes \$3.5T Biden blueprint after deal with moderates. Associated Press. Retrieved from https://apnews.com/article/house-passes-budget-blueprint-0a1258e07b1a8b9aeddb69980093c838.
- Moffett, M. (2019). The human swarm: How our societies arise, thrive, and fall. New York: Basic Books.
- Mulder, M. B., Bowles, S., Hertz, T., Bell, A., Beise, J., Clark, G., ... Wiessner, P. (2009). Intergenerational wealth transmission and the dynamics of inequality in small-scale societies. Science, 326(5953), 682-688. doi:10.1126/science.1178336
- Muller, J. Z. (1997). What is conservative social and political thought? In J. Z. Muller (Ed.), Conservativism: An anthology of social and political thought from David Hume to the present (pp. 3-31). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Murphy, J. (2018). Occupations and their ideologies. Research. Retrieved from https://www.otherlife.co/occupations-and-their-ideologies/.
- The National Bureau of Economic Research. (2020, October 15). Presidents and the U.S. economy: An econometric exploration. from https://twitter.com/nytpolitics/status/117645955 7473804297.
- Platt, J. (1973). Social traps. American Psychologist, 28(8), 641-651. doi: 10.1037/h0035723
- Rawls, J. (1996). Political liberalism. New York: Columbia University
- Robinson, M. D., Cassidy, D. M., Boyd, R. L., & Fetterman, A. K. (2015). The politics of time: Conservatives differentially reference the past and liberals differentially reference the future. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 45(7), 391-399. doi:10.1111/jasp.12306
- Richerson, P. J., & Boyd, R. (2005). Not by genes alone: How culture transformed human evolution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Ridley, M. (2020). How innovation works. New York, NY: HarperCollins.
- Rogers, A. R. (1988). Does biology constrain culture? American Anthropologist, 90(4), 819-831. doi:10.1525/aa.1988.90.4.02a00030
- Rogowski, J. C., & Sutherland, J. L. (2016). How ideology fuels affective polarization. Political Behavior, 38(2), 485-508. doi:10.1007/s11109-015-9323-7
- Roser, M., Ortiz-Ospina, E., & Ritchie, H. (2019b). Life expectancy. Our World in Data. Retrieved from https://ourworldindata.org/lifeexpectancy.
- Roser, M., Ortiz-Ospina, E., & Ritchie, H. (2019a). World population growth. Our World in Data. Retrieved from https://ourworldindata. org/world-population-growth.
- Schlesinger, A. Jr (1949). The vital center. Boston: Houghton Mifflfflin. Schlosser, E. (2015). I'm a liberal professor, and my liberal students terrify me. Vox. Retrieved from https://www.vox.com/2015/6/3/ 8706323/college-professor-afraid.

- Smith, S. (2017, May 2). Why people are rich and poor: Republicans and Democrats have very different views. Pew Research Center. Retrieved from https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/05/02/ why-people-are-rich-and-poor-republicans-and-democrats-havevery-different-views/.
- Sowell, T. (2007). A conflict of visions: Ideological origins of political struggles (revised version). New York: Basic Books.
- Stark, R. (2014). How the West won: The neglected story of the triumph of modernity. Wilmington, DE: ISI Books.
- Sugiyama, L. (2004). Illness, injury, and disability among Shiwiar forager-horticulturalists: Implications of health-risk buffering for the evolution of human life history. American Journal of Physical Anthropology, 123(4), 371–389. doi:10.1002/ajpa.10325
- Tomasello, M. (2016). A natural history of human morality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Tooby, J., & Cosmides, L. (1989). Evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture: I Theoretical considerations. Ethology and Sociobiology, 10(1-3), 29-49. doi:10.1016/0162-3095(89)90012-5
- Tooby, J., & DeVore, I. (1987). The reconstruction of hominid evolution through strategic modeling. In W. G. Kinzey (Ed.). The evolution of human behavior: Primate models. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
- Turchin, P. (2016). Ultrasociety: How 10,000 years of war made humans the greatest cooperators on earth. Chaplin, CT: Beresta.
- Vance, J. D. (2016). Hillbilly elegy: A memoir of a family and culture in crisis. New York: HarperCollins.
- van der Toorn, J., Jost, J. T., Packer, D. J., Noorbaloochi, S., & Van Bavel, J. J. (2017). In defense of tradition: Religiosity, conservatism, and opposition to same-sex marriage in North America. Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin, 43(10), 1455-1468. doi:10.1177/ 0146167217718523
- von Hippel, W. (2018). The social leap. New York: HarperCollins.
- Vranceanu, R., Sutan, A., & Dubart, D. (2012). Trust and financial trades: Lessons from an investment game where reciprocators can hide behind probabilities. The Journal of Socio-Economics, 41(1), 72-78. doi:10.1016/j.socec.2011.10.011
- Wang, S.-Y. N., & Inbar, Y. (2021). Moral-language use by US political elites. Psychological Science, 32(1), 14-26. doi:10.1177/09567976209
- Wilkinson, R. G., & Pickett, K. E. (2009). Income inequality and social dysfunction. Annual Review of Sociology, 35(1), 493-511. doi:10. 1146/annurev-soc-070308-115926
- Williamson, O. E. (1993). Calculativeness, trust, and economic organization. The Journal of Law and Economics, 3(1 Part 2), 453-486. doi:10.1086/467284
- Wilson, P. N., & Kennedy, A. M. (1999). Trustworthiness as an economic asset. The International Food and Agribusiness Management Review, 2(2), 179–193. doi:10.1016/S1096-7508(00)00020-3
- World Wildlife Fund. (2021). Chimpanzee. WWF. Retrieved from https://www.worldwildlife.org/species/chimpanzee.