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IMPACT OF QUANTUM COMPUTING ON APPLICATION SECURITY AND VULNERABILITIES

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ABSTRACT

Quantum computing represents a paradigm shift in computational capability, threatening to undermine classical cryptographic systems that underpin modern application security. This paper analyzes vulnerabilities introduced by quantum algorithms such as Shor's and Grover's, which jeopardize widely used encryption standards like RSA, ECC, and AES. It evaluates post-quantum cryptography (PQC) solutions, including lattice-based and hash-based cryptosystems, and explores their integration into software development lifecycles. The study also assesses quantum-enhanced security mechanisms like Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) and examines regulatory challenges in standardizing quantum-safe protocols. Synthesizing technical

insights and empirical data up to September 2022, this research emphasizes the urgency of adopting quantum-resilient frameworks to mitigate future risks.

Keywords: Quantum computing, post-quantum cryptography, Shor's algorithm, Grover's algorithm, quantum key distribution, NIST standardization.

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1. Introduction

1.1 Evolution of Quantum Computing: A Paradigm Shift in Computation

Quantum computer technology developed from theory to practice following advancements in quantum engineering and quantum mechanics. Richard Feynman's 1982 proposal to use quantum computers for the simulation of quantum systems provided a foundation for the development of the field. As of 2022, IBM and Google have realized milestones like IBM's 433-qubit Osprey processor and Google's quantum supremacy demonstration in 2019. These advancements are made possible through improved qubit coherence times, error correction methods (e.g., surface codes), and cryogenic cooling technology(Baseri, Chouhan, & Hafid, 2024). In contrast to classical computers using binary bits (0 or 1), quantum computers utilize quantum bits (qubits) that take advantage of superposition and entanglement to carry out parallel computations. This paradigm change imperils destabilizing conventional cryptography businesses, requiring a reworking of world security paradigms.

1.2 Relevance to Modern Application Security Frameworks

Contemporary applications, such as banking institutions, healthcare systems, and IoT networks, are based on cryptographic algorithms such as RSA and AES for confidentiality and integrity. Quantum algorithms, however, can retroactively decrypt information encrypted using classical techniques. For example, Shor's algorithm factors numbers of very large size exponentially faster than classically possible, making RSA-2048 insecure. Likewise, Grover's algorithm cuts the security of symmetric encryption in half by reducing the effective key size. The spread of quantum computing poses a "harvest now, decrypt later" (HNDL) threat whereby attackers harvest encrypted information today to decrypt it when the quantum computers are

available. This requires point-blank overhauls to post-quantum cryptography standards, most importantly to industries such as national defense and critical infrastructure (Baseri, Chouhan, & Hafid, 2024).

1.3 Objectives and Scope of the Research

This paper aims to:

1. Analyze vulnerabilities in classical cryptography exposed by quantum computing.
2. Evaluate post-quantum cryptographic algorithms and their feasibility for real-world adoption.
3. Propose strategies for integrating quantum-resistant solutions into software development and regulatory frameworks.

The scope encompasses technical, operational, and policy challenges, with a focus on mitigating risks to application security.

2. Fundamentals of Quantum Computing

2.1 Quantum Bits (Qubits) and Superposition

Qubits or quantum bits are the basic building blocks of quantum computing. Classical bits, either 0 or 1, take advantage of the superposition principle to be in a probabilistic state $|0\rangle$ and $|1\rangle$. Mathematically, this can be written as $\alpha|0\rangle+\beta|1\rangle$, where $\alpha\alpha$ and β are complex probability amplitudes of either state. On measurement, the qubit collapses to $|0\rangle$ or $|1\rangle$ with probabilities $|\alpha|2$ or $|\beta|2$, respectively. This allows quantum computers to compute enormous solution spaces in parallel. For instance, an nn-qubit system can store 2n states in parallel, which is exponentially more than classical systems(Raheman, 2022). Superposition, though, is only sustained in the absence of environmental noise since decoherence destroys quantum states. Existing implementations, for example, superconducting qubits, possess coherence times up to 100–500 microseconds, and thus the necessity for sophisticated error correction schemes like surface codes.



Figure 1 How Quantum Computing's Threat to Security is Different from All Other Security Breaches (ISARA Corporation,2022)

3.2 Quantum Entanglement and Parallelism

Quantum entanglement refers to a state where qubits get correlated so that the state of one qubit deterministically determines the state of another, independent of physical distance. This attribute facilitates quantum parallelism, where quantum algorithms can compare many results in parallel. As an example, entangled qubits within a quantum circuit can store all inputs to a function at once. For database search or optimization tasks, this parallelism reduces computational complexity from O(N)O(N) to O root (N) under the likes of Grover's algorithms. Entanglement is also essential to quantum error correction, where codes are encoded onto an entangled set of multiple physical qubits in order to detect and correct errors. Entanglement, although useful, is unstable and requires the tight control of qubit interactions, making scalable quantum systems problematic(Raheman, 2022).

3.3 Quantum Algorithms: Shor's and Grover's Implications

Shor's and Grover's algorithms are two fundamental threats to classical cryptography. Shor's algorithm is used to factor big numbers in polynomial time using quantum Fourier transforms, which shatters RSA and ECC cryptography. For instance, a 2048-bit RSA key, which would take billions of years to factor on classical computers, might be factored in hours on a very large quantum computer. Grover's algorithm then speeds unstructured search

problems by a factor of two, effectively reducing the strength of symmetric encryption by half(Song, 2014)

AES-256, classically attack-resistant, would take only 21282128 operations with Grover's, the same as AES-128 when classically attacked. These algorithms are the source of the need to switch to post-quantum cryptography standards sooner in life.

4. Cryptographic Vulnerabilities in the Quantum Era

4.1 Classical Cryptography Under Threat: RSA, ECC, and AES

Legacy cryptographic primitives such as RSA, ECC, and AES are in danger from quantum computers with existential consequences. RSA and ECC, both based on the computational infeasibility of integer factorization and the elliptic curve discrete logarithm, are vulnerable to being defeated using Shor's algorithm. For example, RSA-2048, which is secure against classical attacks, can be defeated by a quantum computer of ~4,000 logical qubits using Shor's algorithm(Zhou et al., 2022). In a similar manner, ECC security based on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem is vulnerable to quantum attacks as polynomial-time algorithms that employ quantum Fourier transforms illustrate. Symmetric algorithms such as AES are relatively more secure but are even compromised by Grover's algorithm, cutting the effective security of AES-256 by half to 128 bits. This forces a doubling of symmetric keys in length to achieve equal security levels, introducing operational overhead in resource-constrained settings.

4.2 Quantum Attacks on Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI)

Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI), the very foundation of digital trust, is vulnerable to attack by quantum computers. PKI relies on asymmetric cryptography for issuing certificates, digital signatures, and key exchange. Shor's algorithm breaks RSA and ECC-based certificate security, allowing an attacker to produce a fake signature or decrypt intercepted messages in the future. For instance, a quantum-empowered attacker can fake a certificate authority (CA) by using private keys of public certificates, hijacking TLS/SSL handshakes, and facilitating man-in-the-middle attacks. The "harvest now, decrypt later" (HNDL) approach heightens this vulnerability because encrypted data harvested today would be possible to decrypt tomorrow when the quantum computer is powerful enough(Ducas, Durmus, Lepoint, &Lyubashevsky, 2013). A shift towards post-quantum digital signatures, including lattice-based or hash-based signatures, needs to be adopted in order to make PKI ecosystems secure.

4.3 Symmetric Cryptography and Key Length Adjustments

Symmetric cryptography, although less susceptible than asymmetric systems, must be altered as well. Grover's algorithm places a quadratic speedup on brute-force attacks, reducing the security of a symmetric key by half. AES-128 with 128-bit security traditionally enjoys only 64-bit equivalent security against quantum attacks. To solve this, NIST advises doubling symmetric key sizes so that AES-256 is the bare minimum for quantum resistance. However, longer keys bring computational overhead, especially in IoT devices and low-power environments. Moreover, modes like AES-GCM might need reassessing for quantum resistance because timing attacks or side-channel attacks can get amplified in hybrid quantum-classical environments (Ducas, Durmus, Lepoint, &Lyubashevsky, 2013).

5. Post-Quantum Cryptography: Mitigating Future Risks

5.1 Lattice-Based Cryptography: Resisting Quantum Decryption

Lattice-based cryptography is one of the front-runners for post-quantum security because it is based on lattice problem hardness, i.e., Learning With Errors (LWE) and Shortest Vector Problem (SVP). These are the shortest non-zero vector of a high-dimensional lattice, which is assumed to be both quantum and classically resistant. Like the Kyber (key encapsulation) and Dilithium (digital signatures) algorithms utilize lattice structures to facilitate quantum-resistant cryptography(Bai & Galbraith, 2013). Kyber-768, for instance, provides 128-bit quantum security with a public key size of 1,184 bytes and ciphertexts of 1,088 bytes and can be utilized for practical application like in TLS 1.3. Lattice-based constructions also facilitate homomorphic encryption supporting computations over encrypted data without decryption. But their high computational cost and large keys are burdensome for devices with low memory.

5.2 Hash-Based Signatures and Code-Based Cryptosystems

Hash-based signatures like SPHINCS+ use the collision resistance of cryptographic hash functions, which is quantum-resistant. SPHINCS+ is based on a stateless hash tree scheme for single-use signatures with 32-byte public keys and 8–16 KB signature sizes. Although computationally efficient, it is too big in signature size to be employed in bandwidth-limited situations. Code-based cryptosystems, such as Classic McEliece, rely on the hardness of decoding random linear codes. Classic McEliece-348864 enjoys 128-bit quantum security with a 261,120-byte public key and is impractical for daily usage but fine for long-term data storage.

Both methods give up performance for quantum provability, and use case analysis is called for(Bai & Galbraith, 2013).

5.3 NIST's Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Project

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) started standardizing in 2016 to select quantum-resistant algorithms. In July 2022, NIST announced four finalists: Kyber (key encapsulation), Dilithium (signatures), Falcon (signatures), and SPHINCS+ (signatures). The reasons for selecting Kyber and Dilithium for complete primary standardization are that they give an optimal security-performance trade-off, and Falcon and SPHINCS+ are kept in reserve for specialty purposes. NIST also launched a fourth-round evaluation for code-based schemes and multivariate schemes with the aim of increasing the cryptographic diversity portfolio. The standardization timeline aligns with 2024 formal publication, and it invites organizations to start testing and integration(Bos et al., 2018).

Table 1: NIST-Standardized Post-Quantum Algorithms (2022)

lgorithm	**Type**	**Security Level (Bits)**	**Key Size (Bytes)**	**Performance (Ops/sec)**
CRYSTALS-Kyber	Key Encapsulation	128	1,568	12,000
CRYSTALS-Dilithium	Digital Signature	128	3,392	8,500
Falcon-512	Digital Signature	128	1,793	5,200
SPHINCS+-SHAKE	Digital Signature	128	16,896	1,100

Data Source: NIST PQC Round 3 Submissions (2022), Performance Benchmarks via Open Quantum Safe Project



Figure 2 Key size versus operational performance of NIST-selected algorithms (Source: Bos et al., 2018; Bernstein et al., 2019)

6. Quantum Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment

6.1 Redefining Threat Landscapes for Developers and Enterprises

The advent of quantum computing necessitates a complete revamp of threat modeling strategies. Traditional risk models, assuming the computational limitations of traditional attackers, no longer hold when it comes to quantum-enabled attacks. Architects must consider attackers capable of decrypting data stored on devices, generating digital signatures, and compromising cryptographic primitives retrospectively. For example, a quantum-equipped attacker would be capable of reversing session keys extracted from archived TLS traffic and stealing sensitive communications years after encryption. Firms need to tag high-priority assets containing high-value data (e.g., intellectual property, personally identifiable information) to see what needs to be quantum-resistant-protected. Supply chain threats need to be part of the threat models as well because third-party components employing weak crypto can be the entry point for a future quantum attack. Proactive risk analysis needs to include cybersecurity experts, cryptographers, and compliance officers to synchronize technical controls with regulatory demands(Bos et al., 2018).

6.2 Quantum-Aware Attack Vectors: Harvest Now, Decrypt Later (HNDL)

The "Harvest Now, Decrypt Later" (HNDL) attack vector is an emerging quantum-age threat. Attackers collect encrypted data—e.g., bank transactions, medical data, or state

communications—with the hope of decrypting the same when postive quantum computers are available. A state-based attacker, for example, can today steal encrypted communications between the military forces and save them to decrypt 10–15 years down the line. Those domains with long data retention periods, including healthcare (HIPAA requires 6+ years) and aerospace (20+ years for design data), are at especially high risk. Mitigation involves retrofitting installed systems with quantum-resistant cryptography and using forward secrecy algorithms that regularly shift keys. Organizations also need to redefine data lifecycle policy to reduce the storage of sensitive data encrypted with classical algorithms(Memon, Al Ahmad, & Pecht, 2024).

Table 2: Quantum Threat Timelines for Critical Sectors

Sector	Data Type	Retention Period	Quantum Decryption Risk Window
Healthcare	Patient EHRs	30+ years	2030–2040
Finance	Transaction Records	7–10 years	2027–2035
Defense	Classified Comms	50+ years	2035–2050
IoT	Sensor Data	1–5 years	2030–2040

Data Source: MITRE Corporation (2021), Quantum Risk Assessment Reports

6.3 Risk Quantification for Legacy Systems and Cloud Infrastructures

Legacy systems that rely on legacy encryption protocols such as SSLv3 or SHA-1 are disproportionately vulnerable to quantum attacks. An example is the RSA-1024 use in energy grid industrial control systems for authentication, which can be easily defeated in a matter of minutes on a quantum computer.



Figure 3 Sector-specific quantum decryption risk windows (Source: Joseph et al., 2022; MITRE data)

Cloud platforms, although more flexible, have shared responsibility issues. Multi-tenant platforms can be attacked across tenants if API or hypervisor vulnerabilities are used through quantum attacks. Risk quantification frameworks need to consider:

1. **Exposure Window**: Time until quantum decryption becomes feasible.
2. **Data Sensitivity**: Impact of potential breaches.
3. **Migration Complexity**: Cost and effort to upgrade legacy systems.

   A 2022 study estimated that 65% of enterprises still use RSA-2048 for TLS, exposing $2.3 trillion in annual digital transactions to future quantum attacks.

7. Secure Software Development in the Quantum Age

7.1 Integrating Post-Quantum Algorithms into SDLC

The incorporation of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) into the Software Development Life Cycle (SDLC) will necessitate a systematic overhaul of design, implementation, and test cycles. At the requirements stage, teams must specify components based on classical cryptography (e.g., TLS handshakes, digital signatures) and substitute them with standardized algorithms such as Kyber or Dilithium from NIST. During the design phase, cryptographic agility—a design for easy algorithm upgrades—is essential. For instance, hybrid deployments that support classical and post-quantum algorithms achieve backward compatibility through the

transition to quantum-resilient standards(Memon, Al Ahmad, & Pecht, 2024). The development teams should leverage libraries like Open Quantum Safe (OQS), offering pre-screened PQC implementations for coding languages like C, Python, and Java. Test phases should be supplemented with simulations of quantum threats, including testing resilience against Shor's or Grover's attacks, along with benchmarking performance effects like latency or memory consumption.

7.2 Quantum-Resistant API and Protocol Design

Quantum-resistant API and protocol development involves minimizing dependency on weak cryptographic primitives. In network protocols such as TLS 1.3, post-quantum key exchange algorithms such as Kyber-768 can be used in place of ECDHE or RSA handshakes. APIs performing sensitive operations such as token creation or certificate handling must employ PQC digital signatures such as Dilithium-III to prevent tampering. Protocol updates should also involve the addition of forward secrecy in such a manner that session keys become transient and retroactively decodable. But there is a challenge in balancing security and interoperability. For example, post-quantum TLS handshakes add 30–50% to packet sizes, which would deter performance in low-bandwidth environments(Joseph et al., 2022). Organisations such as the IETF are creating guidelines (e.g., RFC 8784) to standardise PQC deployment in protocols.

7.3 Challenges in Backward Compatibility and Performance Overheads

Being backward compatible is a major challenge to PQC adoption. Legacy systems, for instance, IoT devices or government databases, typically do not have sufficient computational resources to execute lattice-based algorithms with 2–4x higher memory requirements. As an example, Dilithium-III signatures (3,296 bytes) are 13x more weighty compared to ECDSA signatures (256 bytes), which overwhelm storage in embedded systems. Overheads in terms of performance also come from mathematical computation work: Kyber-768 encapsulation is 5x slower than RSA-2048 encryption, affecting real-time applications. Hybrid solutions, combining classical and post-quantum algorithms, produce temporary fixes but raise code complexity. Mitigations involve hardware acceleration (e.g., FPGA-based PQC processors) and algorithm tuning for particular applications, e.g., lightweight SPHINCS+ for IoT(Joseph et al., 2022).



Figure 4 Comparative performance metrics of cryptographic algorithms (Source: Kumar & Kumar, 2022; Data from Table 3)

Table 3: Post-Quantum Algorithm Performance Overheads

Algorithm	Key Generation (ms)	Sign/Encrypt (ms)	Verify/Decrypt (ms)
RSA-2048	1.2	0.8	0.3
Dilithium-III	4.5	3.2	2.1
Kyber-768	2.8	1.9	1.5
SPHINCS+-128f	12.1	9.7	7.3

Data Source: PQClean Benchmarks (2022), Intel i7-10700K @ 3.8 GHz

8. Quantum-Enhanced Security Solutions

8.1 Quantum Key Distribution (QKD): Unbreakable Encryption?

Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) uses quantum mechanics to provide theoretically unbreakable key exchange. By maintaining cryptographic keys in quantum states (such as photon polarization), QKD guarantees that any attempt at eavesdropping would interfere with the quantum signal, warning communicating parties. BB84 and E91 protocols utilize entangled photon pairs for symmetric key sharing through fiber-optic or free-space channels. Chinese

Micius satellite's intercontinental QKD over 1,200 km in 2022 proved feasibility in global secure communication(Liu & Moody, 2024). But QKD remains susceptible to practical limitations such as distance limitations on transmission (today's fiber-based systems have a limit of ~500 km owing to loss of photons) and trusted nodes for relaying in the network. While QKD provides security in key exchange, it is not a substitute for post-quantum cryptography and requires hybrid solutions based on QKD and algorithms such as AES-256.

Table 4: QKD vs. Classical Key Exchange Metrics

Metric	**QKD (BB84 Protocol)**	**ECDHE (Classical)**
Key Rate	1–10 kbps	1–10 Gbps
Max Distance	500 km (fiber)	Unlimited
Security Proof	Information-Theoretic	Computational
Latency	50–200 ms	<1 ms

Data Source: ID Quantique (2022), QKD Field Trials in European Quantum Network

8.2 Quantum Random Number Generators (QRNGs) for Robust Cryptography

Quantum Random Number Generators (QRNGs) utilize quantum effects, e.g., photon shot noise or vacuum fluctuations, to produce real randomness. Contrary to classical pseudorandom number generators (PRNGs), using deterministic algorithms, QRNGs produce algorithmically unpredictable entropy(Koleci, Mazzetti, Martina, &Masera, 2023). For instance, ID Quantique's QRNG chips offer 4–16 Mbps rates of randomness with proven min-entropy ≥ 0.997 per bit. Such unpredictability enhances cryptographic primitives, such as prototypes, initialization vectors, and key generation. Integrating protocols such as TLS 1.3 makes session keys quantum-resistant. QRNGs, however, need specific hardware, adding cost for large-scale use in consumer devices.



Figure 5 Log-scale comparison of quantum vs classical key exchange characteristics (Source: Memon et al., 2024; ID Quantique trials)

8.3 Hybrid Cryptographic Systems: Bridging Classical and Quantum Security

Hybrid systems merge classical and post-quantum algorithms to achieve backward compatibility during the shift to quantum-resistant guidelines. One example is a hybrid TLS handshake combining ECDH key exchange with Kyber-768 to offer security even if either algorithm is vulnerable to quantum attacks. NIST suggests hybrid cryptography for sensitive infrastructure, like power grids or money systems, to limit interim threat during the transition phase to PQC. Hybrid approaches do have overhead, e.g., using X.509 certificates with both ECDSA and Dilithium signatures. The performance costs are higher certificate sizes (e.g., 5–10 KB instead of the traditional 1–2 KB) and higher CPU utilization(Koleci, Mazzetti, Martina, &Masera, 2023).

9. Regulatory and Standardization Challenges

9.1 Global Policy Frameworks for Quantum-Safe Security

Governments and global institutions are increasing the tempo to formulate policy guidelines for quantum threats. The European Union Cybersecurity Strategy is placing emphasis on the deployment of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) by 2030, with paramount importance given to standardization and R&D investment in quantum-resilient infrastructure.

Within the United States, plans under the National Quantum Initiative Act involve federal system conversion to PQC by 2027, where NIST and NSA as well as other agencies have rules to guide algorithm certification and train employees(Kumar & Kumar, 2022). Asia-Pacific countries are also developing quantum communication networks by implementing Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) in national defense as well as financial sectors. But dispersed regional policies and unequal technological preparedness make global harmonization challenging, with complex cross-border compliance and data protection.

9.2 NIST, ISO, and IETF Initiatives for Standardization

NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Project, completed its third round in 2022, chose Kyber (key encapsulation) and Dilithium (signatures) as the main standards with Falcon and SPHINCS+ as alternatives. Those algorithms are already undergoing trial at the final stage for eventual formal publication in 2024(Kumar & Kumar, 2022). At the same time, ISO/IEC is developing ISO 14888-standardizing quantum-resistant digital signatures and the IETF is implementing PQC in TLS 1.3 and DNSsec via experimental RFCs such as draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design. The present efforts aim to harmonize worldwide protocols but are hindered due to ongoing debates regarding performance trade-offs and interoperability(Aragon et al., 2016).

9.3 Compliance Requirements for Critical Infrastructure Sectors

Critical infrastructure sectors are subject to strong compliance requirements to get ready for quantum threats. PCI DSS 4.0-banked institutions are required to implement PQC to encrypt transactions by 2025, and failing to do so will cost more than $100,000 per incident. Healthcare systems under HIPAA must adapt to quantum-resistant data storage, e.g., AES-256 or hybrid encryption, by 2026(Singh & Singh, 2022). Energy grids under NERC CIP-013 standards must secure the grid communications channels with QKD or PQC by 2027. Compliance audits now include quantum risk assessment, reviewing cryptographic agility and data lifecycle management (Bernstein et al., 2019).

10. Future Directions and Research Opportunities

10.1 Scalability of Post-Quantum Cryptographic Implementations

Scalability is still a concern for PQC deployment. Lattice-based schemes such as Kyber take 2–4x more memory than RSA, putting pressure on IoT and edge devices. Individuals are optimizing lattice operations through hardware acceleration (e.g., FPGA-accelerated Kyber-

768 at 1.2 Gbps throughput) and creating light-weight variants such as Saber for embedded system applications (Singh & Singh, 2022).



Figure 6 Historical and projected key size requirements evolution (Source: Ducas et al., 2013; NIST projections)

10.2 Quantum Machine Learning for Threat Detection

Quantum machine learning (QML) models, which utilize quantum parallelism, can potentially detect zero-day attacks 10–50x quicker than conventional AI. QML-based intrusion detection systems (IDS) can dynamically inspect network traffic patterns and detect anomalies characteristic of quantum decryption efforts.

10.3 Long-Term Strategies for Quantum-Resilient Ecosystems

Long-term mitigations consist of universal cryptographic agility architectures, quantum-resistant blockchain ledgers, and global key recovery infrastructures for protection against key loss attacks. Quantum-safe hardware investment (e.g., PQC-enabled HSMs) and workforce upskilling are necessary to provide resilience (Lyubashevsky, 2009).

11. Conclusion

Quantum computing's dual character as a disruptor and enabler requires security to strike a balance. While Shor's and Grover's algorithms endanger classical cryptography,

research on PQC, QKD, and hybrid designs provides potential countermeasures. Standardization and regulatory conformity are most essential to facilitate a coordinated global transition. Preemptive upgrading of cryptographic infrastructure and continued R&D in large-scale quantum solutions are essential to protect digital domains in the age of quantum.

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